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Abstract
This paper explores a form of activism that operates with and within
matter. For more than 150 years materialism has informed activist
practice through materialist conceptions of history and modes of
production. The paper discusses the ambivalences of these previous
configurations of activism and materialism and explores possibilities for
enacting activist interventions in conditions where politics is not only
performed as a politics of history but as the fundamental capacity to
remake and transform processes of matter and life. What is activism
when politics is increasingly performed as a politics of matter? What is
activism when it comes to a materialist understanding of matter itself?
Keywords: activism, materialism, matter, Marx, minor science,
technoscience
I. 1844
The real unity of the world consists in its materiality. . .
(Engels 1987 [1878])
The recent resurgence of materialism poses questions about its
implications and relevance for politics. Rather than addressing
institutional or representational politics I am interested here in tracing
the connections of materialism to the transformative politics of social
movements: collective direct activism on the immediate level of social
and material life. In each particular historical chronotope there is a
distinctive set of social movements which become capable of initiating
social change. How is materialism related to these transformative
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forces? And what kind of political activism do today’s novel forms of
materialism promote?
The articulation between materialism and activism is unstable, full of
discontinuities and breaks. It is in Marx and the early rebellions that
took place in the ‘New World’, and in the Communes and uprisings
across Europe, that materialism first becomes directly linked to political
activism: activist materialism. Since then materialism has been the target
of interrogation not only from idealist positions and various dualist
ontologies but also more recently from within the very political forces
of the western post-1960s Left which were embracing materialism in
one form or another. Critiques from the Left did not position themselves
outside the materialist movement, they were not first and foremost an
opposition; rather, it was an immanent movement enunciated from the
very core of materialism itself that lasted up until the 1980s and 1990s
and finally ushered a new version of materialism to the fore. Deleuze
and Guattari’s work exercised an important influence on the movements
that attempted to rework materialism. During the long history of the
encounter between materialism and activism both of them changed
meanings, and each new formation of the one influenced the meaning
of the other, producing new configurations of social practice.
Marx’s work is probably the first attempt to connect activism and
materialism on the level of everyday political practice. The Theses on
Feuerbach exemplifies the articulation between materialism and activism
in a remarkable and equally unexpected way. Thought objects and
abstract contemplation are what Marx tries to defy, that is, idealism.
The movement which changes society is the movement which opposes
idealism. It is real, objective, that is, material, says Marx. Marx’s
materialism is conceived as sensuous everyday practical activity which
has the capacity to change the material conditions of existence. The
moment of transformation is the moment when, to use Marx’s term,
civil society collapses and a new social material order emerges. This very
modern understanding of materialism was epitomised in The German
Ideology: here communism is not ‘an ideal to which reality have to adjust
itself’; it is ‘the real movement which abolishes the present state of things’
(Marx and Engels 1846: 48).
It is in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844) that
Marx introduces a new definition of materialism grounded on inserting
political activism into the understanding of materiality. Here he uses the
concept of ‘species-being’ to describe human activity as the process of
the self-making of the human species in a direct practical and organic
relation to other species and the whole of the natural world. Despite
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its essentialist connotations, ‘species-being’ is as close as one can get to a
radical understanding of a form of self-instituted collective emancipation
in which cooperation and interaction among humans as well as between
humans and the material world is crucial (Dyer-Witheford 2006). For
Marx the question is to uncover both what impedes this process, i.e. how
capitalist labour alienates ‘species-being’, and how collective material
self-transformation is possible. Who controls the process of material
transformation, who participates and in which position, are questions
which drive Marx’s activist reading of materialism. This materialism is
activist because it is a ‘life activity’, in the literal sense: ‘life engendering
life’. There is no social transformation outside of the material realm.
Marx’s early materialism avoids the pitfall of epistemology: the
attempt to distinguish between a strong materialist perspective which
gives absolute primacy to matter (all that exists is matter) and a weak
materialist perspective that puts the emphasis on how we conceive
matter (all that exists is dependent on matter). Such an epistemological
definition of materialism wouldn’t be sufficient to distinguish it from
idealism because at the end what we define as matter would involve
an idealist move. From an epistemological viewpoint both positions,
the materialist as well as the idealist one, are in principle tenable. But
Marx’s early materialism is ontological through and through: there
is no transformative activity which is non-material. Since activity is
inherently material, matter itself cannot be conceived as an outside or
as an object of human practice: matter is humanity’s body. ‘Species-
being’ is the collective metabolic transformation of matter: activist
materialism. There is a monist understanding of matter here that
resonates with today’s neo-materialism (for a superb example of the
new materialism see Bennett 2010), so much influenced by Deleuze and
Guattari’s work which will be discussed extensively later in the paper.
For now we can say that both Marx’s early materialism and today’s
neo-materialism share a strong emphasis on matter as a vital force:
inorganic matter as well as biological and social life are movements
of matter itself. Nevertheless, in terms of Marx’s early definition of
materialism, merely highlighting the importance of materiality as an
assemblage of heterogeneous forces is not enough to account for
the kind of transformative political engagement that was his main
concern. Marx’s monist ontological materialism is infused with an
activist dimension which takes place on the actual everyday life of
‘species-being’: the collective capacity to affect material change. Marx’s
ontological reading of materialism is one that focuses on practice, but
a form of practice which is not solely in the hands of people but also
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depends on non-human forces (‘nature’). Practice and matter cannot be
thought independently. And the reason for this is not epistemological
but political: activist materialism is a response to capital’s breaking
up of the ‘species-being’ into classes and races. Materialism without
activism is not transformative, in fact it is impossible. This is the
quintessence of Marx’s early account of a practical ontology and an
activist materialism. What happens to this configuration of materialism
34 years before the bicentenary anniversary of the Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts?
Marx’s and in particular Engels’ late work contains a second reading
of the activist materialism developed in their early writings: dialectical
materialism. ‘Diamat’ consolidated the absolute emphasis on matter but
introduced a different conception of its role which had tremendous
impact on theorists of the Second International and the emerging
Marxist social movements. ‘Diamat’ foregrounded activist materialism
as a rather dogmatic epistemological doctrine that gradually removed the
practical ontological concern with matter and subsequently transformed
the meaning of activism. Already in the early writings there are
numerous instances where, instead of the practical ontology described in
the previous paragraphs, we find a relation to nature dominated by the
ideal of progressivism and the total human mastery of nature’s laws. This
understanding also changed the meaning of activism. In Anti-Dühring
(1878) and Ludwig Feuerbach (1886) Engels set out a materialist
cosmology that served to define activism as a political practice which
is mono-causally determined by a set of laws extracted from nature:
historical materialism. This is characterised by both a bifurcated dualist
ontology –with objective material reality and its inherent laws on the
one hand and social practice on the other – and also by a reduction
of materiality to human social institutions and structures. Activism
was reduced to the efficacy of changing social structures. Historical
materialism announces the erasure of the activist materialism to be found
in the early works of Marx and Engels.
II. 1908
Moscow! Moscow! Moscow! (Irina in Chekhov 1900)
In Materialism and Empirio-Criticism Lenin follows this line and
conceives materialism exclusively as a theory of knowledge. He writes:
‘For the sole “property” of matter with whose recognition philosophical
materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of
existing outside our mind’ (Lenin 1908: 260). Materialism here starts
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from the assumption of an ontological duality, two separate entities:
matter on the one hand, mind on the other. Lenin reduces materialism
to gnosiological realism, while the activist materialism of the early Marx
was one which asserted a monist ontology: mind is matter, the unity
of the world is sustained by its materiality and the immanent action of
matter and mind alike. Lenin’s approach is a radical departure from a
position which is concerned with bringing together practice and matter.
Rather, his concern was to develop a conceptual instrument which splits
ideas in two opposite camps. While Marx and Engels’ early activist
materialism was concerned with how matter is changing and can be
changed, Lenin’s materialism was developed as a strategic tool for the
selection of the social and political forces of his time which might
potentially transform into a revolutionary historical subject.
Lenin was building a war machine. He was trying to develop a
philosophical conception of materialism which had no other target
than to reveal the functioning of a deep social dichotomy between the
working class and capital (for an extended analysis of these issues see
Jordan 1967). His only goal was to submit theory to the everyday
requirements of his revolutionary practice. This was truly phenomenal
and unparalleled (albeit fatal). With his philosophical work Lenin
developed a tool to extend the social division as far it could go, to
the far end of mind and the history of ideas. In the unsurpassable
What Is To Be Done? (1902) Lenin claims that social conflict penetrates
every corner of society, every social relation, every idea. Nothing is
untouchable by class antagonism, it takes a partisan organisation and a
revolution to change it. This is partisan philosophy and partisan practice.
And it is a truly activist move; however this particular move enacts a
different materialism. It is carried out in the name of materialism but it
is not an activist monist materialism. It is one which subsumes matter
and dominates nature in the name of historical progress. If Marx’s
early materialism was of a kind which proclaimed the irresistibility of
revolution on the grounds of a unified monist movement of matter
and activism, Lenin’s materialism is dualist, elevating irresistibility to
something completely different: the will for action.
‘Materialism must be a form of idealism, since it’s wrong – too’
(Sahlins 2002: 6). Marshall Sahlins’ aphorism concentrates the post-
Second World War predicament with the configuration of an activist
materialism à la Lenin. Lenin’s reduction of monist materialism
to gnosiological realism had far-reaching consequences for the
philosophical scaffolding of the social forces which found themselves
entangled in the Marxist enterprise and in the emerging working-class
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movements from the beginning of the twentieth century up to the
1970s and 1980s. The most important consequence was that gradually
materialism failed to contribute to an ethical and political programme
for the everyday enactment of activist practice. Activist materialism
became everything but activist, quickly turning into an ideology of
state socialism and an abstract philosophical system. In the post-Second
World War period, materialism gradually lost its strength as an ethical
project for revolutionising everyday practice.
III. 1977
Always historicize! (Jameson 1981)
The end of the 1970s probably saw a peak in the process of an immanent
critique of materialism which rendered visible its contradictions as
inherited from the Leninist period. The following quote from Raymond
Williams displays the state of thought and mood among politically
committed left intellectuals at the time:
It took me thirty years, in a very complex process, to move from that received
Marxist theory (which in its most general form I began by accepting) through
various transitional forms of theory and inquiry, to the position I now hold,
which I define as ‘cultural materialism’. The emphases of the transition – on
the production (rather than only the reproduction) of meanings and values by
specific social formations, on the centrality of language and communication
as formative social forces, and on the complex interaction both of institutions
and forms and of social relationships and formal conventions –may be
defined, if any one wishes, as ‘culturalism’, and even the crude old (positivist)
idealism/materialism dichotomy may be applied if it helps anyone. What I
would now claim to have reached, but necessarily by this route, is a theory of
culture as a (social and material) productive process and of specific practices,
of ‘arts’, as social uses of material means of production. (Williams 1980: 243)
During the period of the crisis of materialism which unfolded in the
decades between 1950 and 1990 the notion of culture reordered the
existing meanings of materialism and fuelled the development of a new
constellation of concepts and activities into the heart of the social conflict
of the post-war period. Of course, not all of the various movements and
critiques of materialism embraced the notion of culture. The point here is
not to unify these extremely diverse movements and traditions under one
overarching rubric. Rather, what is of importance is that the insurgency
against the previous materialism evolved in proximity to new everyday
activities whose many faces and actions pertain to changing cultural
power (see Gilbert 2008; Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos 2008).
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This turn to culture thoroughly changed the way political activism is
performed, moving the target away from the state itself towards power’s
pervasive materialisation in the whole societal nexus: in terms of gender
relations, racialisation processes, social institutions, social and civil
rights, the political representation of excluded groups, and so on. Many
societies, many cultures, many socialisms, Raymond Williams would
have said. This remaking of materialism corresponds with the practices
of new social forces that found themselves outside the traditional
organisational forms of the working-class movement which appeared as
the inheritor of the materialist politics of the previous periods. The new
politics of cultural counterinsurgency, not least as exemplified in the new
youth cultures of the 1960s and the variously globalised events of 1968,
spread across the globe with a velocity far beyond the wildest utopian
dreams that Soviet propaganda bureaucrats and western communist
parties ever imagined for their own materialist politics (see Connery
2005).
But where exactly was the materialism in this activism which
propelled itself through cultural politics? The most likely answer is that
there was very little materialism in this ‘cultural materialist’ politics, at
least not in the sense of an activist and practical ontology concerned
with a monist understanding of matter (as in Marx’s early version).
Nor was there much of the materialism of the late Marx/Lenin period
with its strong focus on gnosiological dualism and the efficacy of social
structures. Cultural politics questioned both versions of materialism
and developed along many disparate and diverse paths: all of which
were, however, occupied with the centrality of representation and its
critiques. ‘Discourse’ seems to have been one of the paths that helped
this move. Ironically, the discursive turn and the turn to language set
in motion an activist politics which followed the activist materialism
of the previous decades. Umberto Eco’s The Open Work (Eco 1989)
and James Clifford’s collection Writing Culture (Clifford and Marcus
1986), as well as the broader linguistic turn (Rorty 1967) and the
interest in hermeneutics (Gadamer 1989), are just some examples of
intellectual engagements that marked the path to the undiscovered
continent of representation. It was through the changing of meanings
and the challenging of representations that the very process of social
activism was now being performed.
Another important path for the revision of materialism that developed
during this period came from an interest in social space as a key
battlefield for social antagonisms. How is space regulated, appropriated
and re-appropriated by marginalised social groups? Marxist inspired
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readings of everyday space (Lefebvre 1991), the situationist movement
(Debord 1981), and cultural geographers (Harvey 1990) all turned to
kaleidoscopic remakings of space in order to articulate an everyday,
mainly urban, activism that made radical interventions in the politics of
post-war Europe and North America possible. The attention to space as
lived experience is closely related to body politics. The body becomes
an open substratum for the inscription and re-inscription of social
signification. In this sense signification moves from the mind itself to
the body and emerges in a process of subjective embodiment through
a social context (cf. Csordas 1994; Harré 1996; Overton 1998) or
through cultural-political constellations (cf. Bourdieu 1987; Braidotti
2002; Fausto-Sterling 2000).
But actually what the activism of the post-war period was mainly
preoccupied with was subjectivity and difference (Blackman et al. 2008).
As cultural studies has so vividly shown, subjectivity is always in the
making because it entails a non-expressed otherness, a non-discursified
and imagined possibility of social relations (Hall 1990; Papadopoulos
2006). Such a theoretical move was particularly important in a period
where identity politics occupied a central place in the political life
of the societies of the Global North (Clifford 2000). Already in the
1970s and 1980s, cultural studies, feminist politics, anti-racism and
gender studies identified the limitations of an activist materialism
qua Lenin which saw social consciousness either as committed to
working-class change or as wrong and ideological. In resonance with
Althusser’s take on ideology (Althusser 2001), new social movements
focused on the emergence of multiple political subjectivities that
defy straightforward classification as wrong (false consciousness) or
right (revolutionary) according to previous conceptions of activist
materialism. Crucial for this attempt was the process of articulation
(Clifford 2001; Hall 1986a; Slack 1996). Activism here is conceived as
a movement of articulation which by rethinking Gramscian hegemony
attempts to contest domination through ‘rendering the symbolic
increasingly dynamic, that is, by considering the conditions and
limits of representation and representability as open to significant
rearticulations and transformations under the pressure of social practices
of various kinds’ (Butler 1997: 23; see also: Hall 1986b; Laclau
and Mouffe 1985). This understanding of political subjectivity as
subjectification and the result of articulation is what essentially
captured activist practices in this period, positioning subjectivity in the
tension between coercion by institutional mechanisms and articulation
through them.
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Cultural politics challenged previous versions of materialism on the
grounds of an increasing diversification of social strata and classes.
It is this diversification that brought a new form of activism which,
rather than focusing on materialism was concerned with the fight for
representation. In this struggle, discourse, space, body and subjectivity
are approached as constitutive of an oppositional politics of difference.
Cultural studies, women’s studies, postcolonial studies and queer politics
have all participated in and critiqued this fight for representation (see
Hall and Jefferson 1976; Clifford 1986; Sedgwick 1990; Spivak 1999;
Warner 1999; Butler, Laclau and Žižek 2000; Mouffe 2000). The
importance of representation comes from the dissolution of social class
as the central actor and political force in society. The political order
of transnational neoliberal societies is an order which is supposed to
be occupied by multiple players working to foster alliances between
themselves and to establish new relations of power. And it is precisely
this form of relationality which triggers the imperative for representation
(Stephenson and Papadopoulos 2006). Representation enters the realm
of politics as the attempt to give voice and operative agency to social
groups who have been excluded by the politics of the traditional versions
of activist materialism. We can trace the singular trajectories of these
emergent oppositional subjectivities of new diverse social groups in civil
rights movements, in the events of 1968, in feminist movements, anti-
work movements and new forms of social cooperation, in the 1960s
cultural rebellions and in the fight against colonialism and racism.
IV. 1987
The only enemy is two. (Deleuze 2001)
However deep the break between Leninist activist materialism and the
cultural materialism of the post-war period might be, there remains
nevertheless a peculiar form of continuity. Lenin’s materialism reduced
activism to the radical intentionality of a subject determined to reflect
the antagonistic conditions of existence. Cultural materialism retained
this reduction but introduced a differentiation with respect to the subject
itself. Instead of a unified self-identical subject we now have a plethora of
subjectivities and of possible contexts in which they are constituted. This
break implied a deep change in the way political activism was conceived:
Leninist activism subsumed every activity under a single social conflict
between labour and capital, while the activism of cultural politics
multiplies the fronts on which social antagonisms are encountered and
Activist Materialism 73
fought. Nevertheless, despite this radical break, both positions retain
a strange commitment to epistemological dualism. Representation and
ideas are the battleground on which the conceptualisation of activism
thrives. It is about negotiating and transforming the conditions of
thinking and feeling that make activism possible. In a peculiar way
cultural materialism followed Lenin’s path in focusing on how we
represent reality. What cultural materialism introduced was a new
conceptualisation of the main determinants of representation. It is no
longer the class structure of society but rather the endless variability
of social contexts that allows different configurations of representation.
In this sense the question for cultural activism becomes one of how
reality is constructed in the subject itself, or ‘social constructionism’.
In both positions, however, practice and matter are subsequent to ideas;
and despite their pervasive critiques of dualism, both retained a dualist
ontology. Here is Deleuze and Guattari’s well-known diagnosis of this
situation:
We invoke one dualism only in order to challenge another. We employ a
dualism of models only in order to arrive at a process that challenges all
models. Each time, mental correctives are necessary to undo the dualisms
we had no wish to construct but through which we pass. Arrive at the
magic formula we all seek – PLURALISM=MONISM–via all the dualisms
that are the enemy, an entirely necessary enemy, the furniture we are forever
rearranging. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 20)
In much of their work, and most centrally in A Thousand Plateaus,
Deleuze and Guattari introduce a monist materialism which attempts to
rehabilitate matter from its enslavement in representation. Their move
is co-extensive with the (re-)appearance of a form of materialism that
puts the primacy of matter on the agenda of political practice and
theory after the 1990s and creates the possibility for the emergence of
a novel configuration of activist materialism. Strangely enough it was
the poststructuralist faction of the cultural activism of the previous
decades that prepared the way for this move – in particular feminist
materialism, the attention to the body, as described earlier, and the
persistent but evasive attempts to put materialism back on the agenda
(one need only recall Althusser’s (2006) subterranean movements).
But even more crucial to the reinvigoration of activist materialism is
the increasing impact of scientific knowledge on everyday life and on
the structures of production in the Global North that posit matter
as an active, self-ordering, emergent player in a radically post-human
world (see Papadopoulos 2010). Matter is before thinking, matter is in
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thinking, matter is everywhere. For Deleuze and Guattari there is no
empty space, there is always matter and matter is always differentiated.
Representations are a particular form of differentiation in their own
right, they do not exist prior to or vis-à-vis matter. Representations
are movements of matter as much as genetic mutations or geological
movements are. Deleuze and Guattari’s point is not to eliminate the
distinctive importance of representations and ideas, rather, their claim
is that when representations are considered as separated from matter
they become strategic tools for ordering material reality. Representations
are closures and reterritorialisations that are used as powers to organise
matter in a particular way.
The materialism emerging gradually after the 1990s focuses on the
question of monism instead of concentrating on the binary opposition
between materialism and idealism. It is this very dichotomy that
undermines monist materialism. It is not about which position you
take in this thinking, it is about the very act of taking a position.
For Deleuze and Guattari the real enemy of materialist thinking is not
idealism, it is dualism. ‘The only enemy is two’ (Deleuze 2001: 95).
Materialism after the 1990s is an anti-dualism that gradually transforms
the relation between activism and materialism that informed most of
social movements during the Leninist period and after: matter and
mind, activism and materialism start to fuse again into one process.
The practice itself, the site of action and its thinking, gradually became
equally important for the activism of the 1990s. It is not a coincidence
that many of the social movements of this period and since focus
on the question of reclaiming. The activism of reclaiming attempts
to re-appropriate the immediate spaces of existence by simultaneously
transforming them through everyday actions: reclaim the streets, reclaim
the city, earth activism and the permaculture movement, the remaking
of transnational spaces through migration movements, radical queer
activism and the building of new social relationalities and communities,
cyberactivism, the alter-globalisation movement, the production of the
commons. In all of them we encounter an emphasis on reclaiming
material spaces and relations vital for developing new alternative social
and material projects (for an extended discussion see Papadopoulos
et al. 2008; Chesters andWelsh 2006). This was, of course, also a central
characteristic of previous forms of political activism, in particular of
feminism. But the primary difference here is that either the question of
reclaiming social and material spaces was not conceptualised as such or
else was considered secondary with regards to the ‘real’ and ‘primary’
struggle, which was supposed to focus on radical demands addressed to
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the state and its institutions in respect of recognition and representation.
In contrast, the activism emerging after the 1990s, and in particular since
the Zapatista movement, is less concerned with the state’s mediation;
instead it consciously attempts to force existing institutions to change by
creating alternative materialities and forms of life.
Deleuze and Guattari’s monist materialism captures a key moment of
this form of activism that reconnects us with the activist materialism
of the early Marx described at the beginning of this paper. It is the
question of how to change matter and create new forms through
collective practices. Deleuze and Guattari’s materialism questions how
the very moment of morphing matter comes into being. The emergence
of form is neither the transcendent imposition of a preconceived plan on
matter – forget the architect and the bee – nor is it simply a movement
of self-organised matter that becomes represented in the mind of the
subject – forget autopoietic systems. Neither external plan, nor internal
self-organisation. In this sense, it is neither idealism nor materialism (as
conceived until now). The position Deleuze and Guattari try to develop
is that it is the movement of matter itself that makes both a materialist
as well as an idealist stance possible. Both the capacity to create form
and the capacity to understand the emergence of form are immanent
to existence. There is no monism if there is a dualist option; ‘there is
nothing that is one, there is nothing that is multiple’ (Deleuze 2001:
99). Deleuze and Guattari tried to avoid thinking along the either-or
of materialism and idealism/dualism. The very possibility of thought is
immanent to matter’s movements.
Morphogenesis in Deleuze and Guattari is neither a property of self-
ordering material systems nor the result of a vitalist force that initiates
material change; nor of course is it the ability of the subject’s mind
to form matter according to a preconceived plan. There is something
not immediately present in the actuality of material flows – something
virtual – that makes matter congeal into stratified stable forms. In each
particular setting there is a virtual ordering principle (an abstract
machine in Deleuze and Guattari’s words) that links and connects flows
and properties of matter. An often utilised example in A Thousand
Plateaus is the organism. When does an aggregate of various bodily
processes and functions become a thing which can be called an
organism? An organism is ordered matter – the moment when matter in
flux, in movement, in variation becomes a discernible thing amenable to
intervention, management, manipulation (through medical practice for
example, or in the course of ontogenetic development). Embryology and
biology, medicine and psychology, play an equal role with ontogenetic
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change, gene activity, epigenetic interactions and the environment to
produce a coherent story of what an organism is in a particular
historical chronotope. Out of the movement of unformed matter and
non-formalised processes of the body without organs (BwO), as Deleuze
and Guattari call the non-organismic body, we encounter the formed
and stratified form of the organism:
The organism is not at all the body, the BwO; rather, it is a stratum on
the BwO, in other words, a phenomenon of accumulation, coagulation, and
sedimentation that, in order to extract useful labor from the BwO, imposes
upon it forms, functions, bonds, dominant and hierarchized organizations,
organized transcendences. The strata are bonds, pincers. ‘Tie me up if you
wish.’ We are continually stratified. But who is this we that is not me, for
the subject no less than the organism belongs to and depends on a stratum?
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 159)
In this understanding of monist materialism, matter becomes the horizon
and the substratum on which an alternative to the previous versions
of materialism can emerge. Matter becomes (once more) the way to
reconnect activism and materialism. The crucial move for materialism
since the 1990s is to seek in matter an escape from a situation
where the demise of the everyday transformative activist aspect of
materialism became so pervasive. Deleuze and Guattari’s move to a
monist materialism is not a theoretical choice; it is the result of a
political diagnosis according to which any desire for change has been
vampirised by the institutions of the state. Even more than that, in
the previous decades desire itself has been transformed into a capitalist
institution (cf. Holland 2005). Every social struggle is reinserted as a
rejuvenating feature of capitalist production, every social innovation is
made productive. The story of the twentieth century is not a history of
revolutions; it is rather a history of counter-revolutions (Müller 2000)
where every desire has been appropriated, regurgitated and effaced
by capitalism. The bottom line for Deleuze and Guattari’s take on
materialism, as a monist materialism based on a renewed attention to
matter, is the attempt to reactivate the transformative force of desire.
Deleuze and Guattari try to do this by breaking the link between ‘desire’
and ‘desire for’. Every ‘desire for’ is a closure: desire for revolution,
desire for mastering nature, desire for recognition, desire for an identity,
desire for not having an identity, desire for desire. This is the political
move Deleuze and Guattari reinsert into the new materialism: to disrupt
the view that the creativity of people, animals and matter can be viewed
as a desire which can always be folded back into capitalist domination
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and valorisation. Every ‘desire for’ is already captured and appropriated.
This is the spell capitalism casts upon life.
The key political ingredient of monist materialism is that desire needs
to be disarticulated from its essential function as something which has
a target and object. The diagnosis: ‘desire for’ is the way capitalism
revolutionises itself. The radical political key to monist materialism is
that it allows desire to be engendered in a way that can move beyond
its recoding into the political closures of the counter-revolutions of
the twentieth century. The prominent role of matter in Deleuze and
Guattari is a small gesture of rebellion against the capture of earlier
materialisms within a docile machine for constantly revolutionising
capitalism. Deleuze and Guattari perform this small gesture of freedom
by inserting indeterminacy into the way desire operates; and they do so
by turning to the underlying indeterminacy of matter: matter is primarily
unformed and in continuous variation, an oscillation between various
intensities, closures and openings. Matter is a political exit. Matter is
escape. The making of a life. Matter can break the capitalist spell.
The turn to matter becomes political when it is articulated in relation
to this understanding of desire. That is why, despite the various attempts
to read Deleuze and Guattari’s materialism in a scientistic way – that
is, as a cosmology attentive to science (see for example De Landa
1997) –what Deleuze and Guattari propose is a rather minor move, one
which attempts to interrupt the appropriation of desire by grounding
it in the indeterminate movements of matter. Deleuze and Guattari
refer to this move also as a science but crucially a minor science (or
a nomad, ambulant, itinerant science). In Proposition III of the War
Machine chapter in A Thousand Plateaus they describe this as a practice
which follows matter’s immanent traits, confronts problems instead
of applying theorems, pushes matter to the next threshold, connects
practical effects and affects of practice. Against a science of matter or
a technology to control it, Deleuze and Guattari emphasise practice as
the key dimension of a minor science that knows how to surrender to
matter. Minor science is a practice which is essentially experimental;
rigorous but not systematic, it directly links activity with matter. It is
here that the neo-materialism of the 1990s and after can once again
become activist, with minor, nomad science on the one hand and the big,
royal, imperial science of the state on the other: ‘What we have . . . are
two formally different conceptions of science, and, ontologically, a single
field of interaction in which royal science continually appropriates the
contents of vague or nomad science while nomad science continually cuts
the contents of royal science loose’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 367). If
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there is to be an activism of neo-materialism it will be developed in the
decades to come from the practices of the nomad scientist, the artisan
who operates within the constraints of matter, who follows singular
material possibilities, and who thereby escapes state striation.
V. 2027
Among the tortures and devastations of life is this then – our
friends are not able to finish their stories. (Woolf 1992)
Minor science is embedded in a reality primarily defined by the
centrality of scientific knowledge for the making of a polity in the
societies of the Global North. Politics are increasingly performed
through science itself (cf. Papadopoulos, forthcoming 2011). Physical,
biological, chemical bodies can be thought as political in their own right
(Protevi 2001). Minor science can respond to this tight articulation of
politics and scientific knowledge. Simultaneously scientific knowledge is
a constitutive element of a transformation traversing the societies of the
Global North by becoming increasingly distributed in society (the so-
called ‘knowledge society’). The figure of the ‘socialised worker’ (Negri
2005) captures this move to a mode of production and circulation based
on the valorisation of the totality of life and the intellectual creativity of
the individual worker. In this context, scientific knowledge on the one
hand becomes explicitly political and, on the other, permeates a wider
range of social strata than ever before in the Global North.
Minor science is part of the social material conditions prevailing
today; it operates below and outside state science and yet, as discussed
in the previous section, it is continuously under pressure to be absorbed
into the big science of the state.
The fact is that the two kinds of science have different modes of formalization,
and State science continually imposes its form of sovereignty on the inventions
of nomad science. State science retains of nomad science only what it can
appropriate; it turns the rest into a set of strictly limited formulas without
any real scientific status, or else simply represses and bans it. (Deleuze and
Guattari 1987: 362)
Even the very idea of minor science itself can be buried under the
desire for the new grand theory which can be assimilated into state
science. The minor science of matter can be deployed to support a new
grand system of thought; a grand theory that uses all the fashionable
and marketable concepts and ideas circulating today – complexity,
event, affect, multiplicity, networks, assemblages, etc. – to create a new
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meta-framework with which to approach the world. Cosmopolitical
assembling as a new cosmology. A new abstract theory. Producing
a new grand theory is one possible trap for today’s minor science.
A Deleuzian century? This would be the end of every inspiring and
transformative potential of today’s neo-materialism. The unfinished
story of contemporary minor science is that it can so easily become
absorbed into the workings of state science, that is, become a ‘desire
for’ a grand system, a philosophical materialism devoid of its activist
element. This kind of philosophical materialism will then become
nothing but a form of governance of things and events. Latour the
governor, Badiou the priest, Žižek the buffoon: actors in the imperial
court in which state science feeds on the practices of minor science to
produce a new cosmology that shapes technoreality.
Minor science and state science are inextricably bound together. In
fact, minor science exists in the very core of state science. Pamela
Smith has shown how artisan production – probably the most vital
aspect of minor science –was crucial for the emergence of the rationalist
objectivist scientific world-view which came to dominate the western
world increasingly after the sixteenth century. It was the artisans’
work, an intellectual revolution from bottom up, that ‘transformed
the contemplative discipline of natural philosophy into an active one’
(Smith 2006: 239). Artisan science was later codified and appropriated
into a new disembodied epistemology of experimental science. But
experimental science never abandoned artisanal production. In fact
experimental science and imperial science always rely on artisanal
production and the minor science of matter. It was thanks to the
purported modesty of meticulous artisanal efforts that Boyle’s bottom-
up experimental laboratory science won out over Hobbes’ top-down
geometric science (Shapin and Schaffer 1985; Haraway 1997).
This is even more the case today. In experimental science, the
‘discovery’ of ‘natural facts’ and ‘realities of matter’ was a distinct
procedure that preceded possible technological applications. With the
rise of technoscience, such applications become the very drive behind
basic research. Discovery is fabrication. Science is not about observation
but about modification. This situation creates an even more intense
pressure for maintaining minor science, making it part of the fast-moving
world of technoscientific research. In other words, one of the main
characteristics of minor science – its interventionist, direct, ambulant
quality – is now a dominant feature of technoscience itself. Propelled by
the post-Second World War rise of big science, the later proliferation
of the assembly-line industrial scientist (see Shapin 2008), the spread
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of an entrepreneurial scientific culture, the neoliberalisation of research
culture and the precarisation of intellectual and affective labour, science
and its applications increasingly fold into each other. Minor science fuels
the everyday workings of contemporary technoscience.
Scientific practices and objects are as much the result of artisanal work
as they are of the precarised labour of industrial scientists and of the
entrepreneurial investments of corporate and state science. The problem
is not so much that minor science and state science meet and collide – an
image which Deleuze and Guattari have pictured in their all too typical
masculinist reading of science as an agonistic field in A Thousand
Plateaus. Rather, minor science and state science co-constitute what
Donna Haraway calls zones of implosion where the boundaries between
human and non-human, nature and artificiality, are meaningless:
‘the chip, gene, bomb, fetus, seed, brain, ecosystem, database’. Such
imploded technoscientific objects make up the conditions of our actual
material presence in the world, they are ‘wormholes that dump contem-
porary travelers out into contemporary worlds’ (Haraway 1997: 43).
The entanglement of minor and state science is the very reality in
which our material existence unfolds. In these conditions the crucial
challenge for minor science is to engage with radical activism again.
Among the questions this activism is facing today are the following: How
can minor science contribute to the immediate making of liveable words
(Haraway 2007; Puig de la Bellacasa 2010; in press)? How can justice be
inscribed in relation to our technological objects, our cells and organs,
the water, the air, the soil? And how can material justice be instigated in
a non-dualistic manner?
As minor science implodes into big state science and itself tends
towards a grand system of thought, rather than theorise this implosion,
it may be we need to fabulate. Thriving in communities which will only
selectively make use of big state science the new activisms that will
emerge in the decades to come will be truly operating on the level of
matter. They will mobilise radical political interventions through intra-
acting with and within matter. The remaking of matter engenders radical
liberation projects. And thus perhaps our almost 200-year-old tale of
emancipation will happily become a reality.
Note
I am grateful to Marcelo Svirsky for his insightful suggestions and
encouragement. Special thanks go to Maria Puig de la Bellacasa, Hywel
Bishop and Jan L. Harris for their critical engagement with the text.
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